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DUTY TO RESCUE ... I 
DUTY TO RESCUE THROUGH THE LENS OF 
MULTIPLE-PARTY SEXUAL ASSAULT 
RENU MANDHANEt 
In 1983, a woman in a Massachusetts bar was hoisted onto a pool 
table and sexually assaulted by several men for over an hour. Patrons of 
the bar did not offer assistance to the woman. Many people simply 
watched as she was degraded while others yelled encouragement to the 
people assaulting her. 1 While incidents of multiple-party sexual assault 
(or "gang rape") are shocking, they are not anomalous. Essentially, 
multiple-party sexual assault is an extreme manifestation of the 
widespread gender-specific violence that appears to be overlooked and 
perpetuated in our society. For example, statistics suggest that thirty-
nine percent of women in Canada experience some fonn of sexual 
assault during their lifetime, while only six percent of sexual assaults are 
ever reported to the police.2 Indeed, gender-specific violence is a harsh 
reality in Canadian society. To make matters worse, female victims 
often do not report because they feel the legal system cannot help them.3 
Unfortunately, this lack of faith in the Canadian criminal justice 
system is well founded. It is common to hear survivors of sexual assault 
characterize the Canadian criminal justice system as another form of 
victimization.4 Women are forced to reveal intimate details regarding 
their sexuality and often feel as though they are on trial for 'provoking' 
t The author would like to thank the many people who read and commented on earlier 
drafts of this paper, especially the Editors at the Dalhousie Journal (}/Legal Studies, Professor 
Hamish Stewart, Professor Lorraine Weinrib, Pamela Cross, Sheila Gibb, and Damon MmTay. 
The author would also like to thank the law firm of Torys for finacial support through the 
J.S.D. Tory Writing Fellowship. 
1 R. A. Prentice, "Expanding the Duty to Rescue" (1985) 19 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 15 at 16 
[hereinafter Prentice]. 
2 Statistics Canada, The Daily: Sta!istics Ca11ada: The Violellce Agail!s/ Women Surwy 
(Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology, 18 November 1993) at 2, 6. 
[hereinafter Statistics Canada]. Unfo1iunately, these are the most recent statistics compiled by 
Statistics Canada relating to the impact of violence crime on women. 
3 Ibid. 
4 K. Gallivan and S. Bazilli, Sexual Assault: A Guide to the Crimli1al System (Toronto: 
Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children, 1994) at 4. 
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the assault. 5 Finally, the legal principles surrounding criminal 
culpability often fail to take into account the victim's perspective. For 
example, in the scenario described above, while the men who sexually 
assaulted the woman and the people who yelled encouragement could be 
charged with sexual assault, the voyeurs would not be criminally 
culpable. This lack of culpability for bystanders fails to capture the 
reality of the situation for sexual assault victims. It is probable that the 
presence of bystanders causes further psychological harm to the victim.6 
Yet, the law allows bystanders to watch as a woman is dehumanized free 
from any obligation to help the victim. 
The lack of culpability for voyeurs is morally reprehensible and 
suggests that traditional sexual assault analysis is inadequate for dealing 
with cases of multiple-party sexual assault. It is submitted that reform 
within the Criminal Code is necessary to ensure culpability for such 
morally repugnant acts. 7 One solution is to enact a duty to rescue 
provision for cases where the victim is in the midst of a violent criminal 
attack and the rescuer is able to assist without injury to him/herself.8 
While such a reform represents a large departure for Canadian law, this 
change is warranted to protect women and to make the justice system 
more accountable to female victims of multiple-paiiy sexual assault. If 
the system becomes more aligned with the victim's perspective, it is 
probable that more women will report incidents of sexual assault and, in 
particular, incidents of multiple-party sexual assault. 
5 /bid. 
6 There are numerous psychological studies that suggest that posttraumatic stress disorder 
is more severe in victims of sexual assault who were degraded or dehumanized during the 
attack. See I. T. Bownes, E. C. O'Gorman, & A. Sayers, "Assault Characteristics and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Victims" (1991) 83 Acta Psychiatri Scand 27 at 27 
[hereinafter Bownes]. See generally D. Silverman et al., "Blitz Rape and Confidence Rape: A 
Typology Applied to 1,000 Consecutive Cases" (1988) 145:11 Am J Psychiatry 1438. 
7 R.S.C.1985, c. C-34 [hereinafter the Code]. 
8 Throughout this paper the te1m "duty to rescue" is used broadly to refer to any affirmative 
obligation to assist a victim of crime. Therefore, a duty to rescue may include such diverse acts 
as reporting the crime to the appropriate officials, giving first aid to the victim, or physically 
freeing the victim from his/her aggressor, depending on the circumstances. The breadth of the 
definition given to the term "duty to rescue" is meant to highlight the fact that there are many 
methods by which an ordinary citizen can decrease the harm associated with violent crime. 
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I. THE SITUATIONS CONTEMPLATED 
Before discussing the duty to rescue in more detail, it is instructive 
to present examples of situations where a victim of sexual violence 
would benefit from a positive duty to rescue. While the examples that 
follow relate to multiple-party sexual assault, the duty to rescue could 
also benefit women (and men) in situations of domestic violence, simple 
assault, murder, and other violent crimes.9 Therefore, the multiple-party 
sexual assault scenario is intended as an extreme example, without 
suggesting that this is the only situation, where the duty to rescue would 
be beneficial. 
i. R. v. Dunlop and Sylvester 
In the case of R. v. Dunlop and Sylvester, 10 the sixteen-year-old 
victim, Brenda Ross, and a friend went to a hotel in Winnipeg for a 
drink. At the club, Ross and her friend met various members of the 
motorcycle club the Spartans, including the accused, Dunlop. After 
Ross had consumed approximately five or six drinks, she and her friend 
agreed to go for a motorcycle ride with two members of the Spartans. 
The Spartans took the women to a secluded area outside of the city. 
Upon arrival, the group dispersed and Ross was left by herself. Soon, 
however, four other Spartans arrived. They took Ross by the anns and 
legs, carried her to a nearby creek and threw her on the ground; they 
were joined by a number of other men who ripped her clothes off. While 
Ross was pinned to the ground by two men, approximately eighteen 
others raped her. Other men stood around and watched. Ross claimed 
that the co-accused, Dunlop and Sylvester, were among the men who 
raped her; their story differed from hers. Dunlop and Sylvester 
contended that they had been sent to fetch beer for the group and had 
9 It should be noted that the focus of this analysis is on the duty to rescue in relation to 
violent crimes. The issue of whether or not there should be a duty to rescue in response to 
natural threats such as drowning, and fire will not be addressed. The exclusion of discussion 
on natural threat is not intended to suggest that such a duty should not exist. Rather, it is a 
reflection of the fact that the rationale for a duty to rescue in response to natural threat would 
be quite different from the one put forward in this paper. For example, the issues of 
victimization and dehumanization relied on here to support a duty to rescue in relation to 
multiple-party sexual assault do not make intuitive sense in terms of a duty to rescue in natural 
threat situations. 
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the rest. Upon their arrival, they claimed that they 
top of a hill. From this viewpoint, they saw Ross 
act of sexual intercourse. Those standing around Ross 
co-accused expressing their dissatisfaction at the lateness 
and Sylvester alleged that they left soon after. 
scenario and today's law, who would be culpable? The 
had sexual intercourse with Ross would be charged 
under s.271 of the Code and there can be little doubt 
held Ross down while the others abused her would be 
assault through s.21(b). 11 But what is the culpability 
simply watched while Ross was sexually assaulted 
sake of argument, Dunlop and Sylvester? Assuming 
and those who were by the creek were aware that 
attacked, are they liable? As Canadian law stands today, 
be guilty of any crime. In fact, quoting from an old 
the Supreme Court stated that: 
' .. .in order to render a person an accomplice and a principle in felony, 
he must be aiding and abetting at the fact, or ready to afford assistance 
and therefore if [the accused] happeneth to be present at a 
murder, for instance, and taketh no part in it, nor endeavoureth to 
it, not apprehendeth the murderer,, nor levyeth hue and cry 
after this strange behaviour of his, though highly criminal, will 
not of itself render him either principle or accessory.' 12 
on this well-established common law principle, Justice 
that the accuseds in Dunlop were not parties to the 
in s.21 of the Code. Moreover, since there is no legal 
a person who is in the midst of intense victimization, 
nor Sylvester were convicted of any crime relating to the 
10 [ 1979] 2 S.C.R. 881 [hereinafter Dunlop]. 
11 Section 2 l (I) states that: 
Everyone is a party to an offence who 
(a) actually commits it; 
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to 
commit it; or 
(c) abets any person in committing it. 
supra note l 0 at 891. 
' 3 There are certain narrow exceptions to this rule that are discussed in more detail in 
Section ll. 
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it: R. v. Clarkson and others 
R. v. Clarkson and others is an English case 
those in Dunlop. 14 The individuals accused were 
serving in Germany. On the night in question, a 
attending a party in the barracks was taken into a room 
fellow soldiers and sexually assaulted at least three 
persons entered and watched as the assaults took place. 
the accused had done any physical act or uttered any 
apparent that their presence in the room was not 
entered the room because they had been told that a 
place, and it was obvious from the evidence that 
voyeurs. 
Again, it is instructive to consider who is liable 
obvious that those who engaged in the act of intercourse 
would be charged with rape. However, would the 
guilty through aiding and abetting? The judge Clarkson 
that they were not guilty of rape through aiding 
they did not engage in any positive acts to further 
offence. In particular, Megaw J. emphasized that: 
It must be proved that the accused intended to give encouragement: 
that he wi!jiil!y encouraged .... [T]hat essential element should be 
stressed; for there was here at least the possibility that a drunken man 
with his self-discipline loosened by drink, being aware that a woman 
was being raped, might be attracted to the scene and might stay on 
scene in the capacity of what is known as a voyeur: and, while his 
presence and the presence of others might in fact encourage the rapers 
or discourage the victim, he himself, enjoying the scene or at least 
standing by and assenting, might not intend that his presence should 
offer encouragement to rapers or would-be rapers or discouragement 
to the victim; he might not realise that he was giving encouragement: 
so that, while encouragement there might be, it would not be a case 
which ... the accused person 'wilfully encouraged' .15 
Thus, by focusing on the strict common law principle 
offence must 'wilfully encourage' the primary ... , 
elucidates the reasons why the law surrounding aiding 
14 (1971) 3 All E.R. 344 [hereinafter Ckmf.so11]. 
15 ibid., at 347. 
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to address adequately situations of multiple-party sexual assault. 16 That 
is, regardless of the accused's intentions, the fact remains that there is 
strength in numbers in multiple-party sexual assault scenarios and that 
the accused may have encouraged the rapists through their mere 
presence. However, by focusing on whether or not the accused wilfully 
encouraged the commission of the offence, Megaw J. is able to find the 
accused person not guilty. 
Even if we disregard the problems associated with the definition of 
aiding in relation to sexual assault, the judgment is still troubling. Like 
the onlookers in Dunlop, the voyeurs in this case cannot be held 
criminally liable for any offence relating to the assault; while they enjoy 
sexual gratification from watching the dehumanization of the victim, 
they are not punished in any way. It is ironic that, while the depiction of 
dehumanizing sexual intercourse on videotape is illegal in Canada, 17 
Clarkson and cases similar to it are followed in our jurisprudence. 18 Like 
the Supreme Court of Canada, English judges also refuse to recognize a 
positive duty to rescue in multiple-party sexual assault cases involving 
not-so-innocent bystanders. 
TO RESCUE IN ANGLO-CANADIAN LAW: 
RELUCTANCE TO IMPOSE A POSITIVE DUTY 
As illustrated in Dunlop and Clarkson, the Anglo-Canadian 
common law has been traditionally reluctant to recognize or impose a 
duty to rescue. This reluctance is based on a variety of concerns that 
range from philosophical to practical in nature. This section outlines the 
major arguments made by those who oppose implementation of a duty to 
rescue. These arguments suggest that imposition of such a duty is 
contrary to the common law distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance, stands in opposition to the liberal concept of 
individualism, misunderstands the concept of negative liberties and 
16 There is a similar requirement in Canadian law; the accused must have intended the 
consequences that flowed from his aid. See R. v. Greyeyes (1997) 8 C.R. (5th) 308 (SCC) 
[hereinafter Gr<".Feyes]. 
17 R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler]. 
18 Dulllop, supra note 10 at 485. See also R. v. Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534. 
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rights, obscures the moral value of rescuing and, finally, is wrought with 
practical difficulties. Along with discussing each of these claims, an 
attempt has been made to formulate a coherent response to each of these 
allegations. 
Z: Ihe Miijeasance and Nonfeasance Distinction 
The main argument against a duty to rescue hinges on the traditional 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. By definition, 
misfeasance is "active misconduct that causes positive injury to 
another," while nonfeasance is "inaction that represents a failure to take 
positive steps to benefit another." 19 Liability cannot be imposed for a 
nonfeasance, such as a failure to rescue, because there is no general legal 
duty to confer benefits on others.20 In practice, the Anglo-Canadian 
common law has maintained the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction 
through reluctance to criminalize omissions, regardless of their moral 
blameworthiness. 21 
There are three arguments to counter those made by traditionalists. 
While traditionalists claim that there is a stark line between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance, in reality the boundary is blurred. 22 Consider the 
example of the onlookers in Dunlop and Clarkson. While none of the 
men watching the sexual assaults took active steps toward commission 
of the offence and, therefore, are not engaged in a misfeasance, it is false 
to say that they did not aid in the commission of the offence. While their 
failure to lend assistance to the victim could be characterized as a 
nonfeasance, this is clearly a reading of the facts that ignores the group 
dynamics of multiple-party sexual assault. Indeed, the fact that 
numerous men watched as the assaults occmred can be seen as a 
misfeasance. According to the adage "there is strength in numbers,'' the 
onlookers caused positive harm to the victim by decreasing the 
likelihood that she would escape from her aggressors. Also, it is likely 
that the feelings of shame and victimization experienced by the victim of 
a multiple-party sexual assault is increased by the presence of voyeurs, it 
19 F. E. Denton, "The Case Against a Duty to Rescue" ( l 991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jur. 101 at 101 . 
20 C. H. Shroeder, "Two Methods for Evaluating Duty to Rescue Proposals" (1986) L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 181 at 181. While Shroeder describes the legal tradition in the United States, 
his analysis, in this instance, is equally applicable to Anglo-Canadian law. 
21 R. v. !11sta11 [1893] 1 Q.B. 450. 
22 Prentice, supra note I at 35. 
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is false to contend that these feelings are not harmful.23 Moreover, it is 
possible that the presence of silent on-lookers encourages the aggressors 
and contributes to their feelings of power.24 Thus, multiple-party sexual 
assault is an example of a scenario where the distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance is bluITed. 
Anglo-Canadian law has already shown some willingness to depart 
from the traditional misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. In particular, 
the courts have recognized a number of cases where a failure to act will 
be criminally culpable. For instance, omissions are culpable if there is a 
recognized relationship, such as parent-child or doctor-patient, between 
the non-actor and the victim.25 Imposing a duty to rescue does not 
necessarily mean that the law will do away with the general rule that a 
person is not liable for omissions. Rather, such a duty simply establishes 
a new exception to the rule for cases where someone is faced with the 
prospect of a grave criminal attack and can be assisted without hann to 
rescuer. 
Finally, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction can still be 
maintained even with culpability for nonfeasance. That is, if someone is 
morally blameworthy in omitting to confer a benefit (a nonfeasance ), 
they can still be held criminally liable to a lesser degree than the person 
who commits a misfeasance. This characterization maintains the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction without allowing morally culpable 
actors to escape punishment. In practice, the onlookers in Dunlop and 
Clarkson would be charged with failure to rescue, with a conviction 
carrying a more lenient sentence than the primary offence of sexual 
assault. 
it: The Traditional Liberal Concept qf Individualism 
Another frequent claim against imposing a duty to rescue arises 
from the traditional Western concept of individualism. This claims rests 
on the assumption that each person is capable of caring for themselves 
23 Bownes, supra note 6. 
24 It is widely acknowledged in the literature surrounding sexual assault that the attacks are 
more about power than they are about sex; the perpetrator uses sex as a means of dominance 
over the victim. See the early work by L. Clark & D. Lewis, Rape: The Price o/Coercive 
Se.ruali!v(Toronto: Coach House Press, 1977) at 27. 
25 B. A. Seagraves, "The Duty to Rescue in California: A Legislative Solution?" ( 1984) 15 
Pacific L. J. 1261 at 1266 [hereinafter Seagraves], and!?. v. Russe/[1933] V.L.R. 59. 
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and is entitled to act, without obligation to others, in furtherance of his/ 
her self-interest.26 Extending this to the law, it is contended that duties to 
rescue infringe the personal autonomy of both the rescuer and the 
rescued. The rescuer is forced to pursue a goal that may be opposed to 
his/her inclination, while the rescued suffers a decrease in his/her ability 
to handle a situation independently. 
Many feminists have criticized this concept of individualism as 
morally destructive and even mistaken. In fact, Held suggests that the 
paradigmatic autonomous relationship should not be that between 
rational, self-interested men but, rather, that shared by a mother and 
child.27 If we take this suggestion seriously, autonomy is hinged on our 
interdependence, not on our ability to deny our responsibilities to others: 
The whole tradition that sees respecting others as constituted by non-
interference with them is more effectively shown up as inadequate. It 
assumes that people can fend for themselves and provide through their 
own initiatives and efforts what they need. This Robinson Crusoe 
image of 'economic man' is false for almost everyone.28 
Therefore, if we refonnulate our conception of individualism, a duty to 
rescue may actually promote autonomy. According to Nedelsky, it is our 
interdependence and personal link to other people that lies at the root of 
our own autonomy and allows us to increase the autonomy of others.29 
Thus, a feminist would likely see a duty to rescue as a method of 
promoting autonomy through mutual responsibility.3° Consider 
situations illustrated by Dunlop and Clarkson. It is obvious that the 
victim's lack of autonomy in multiple-party sexual assaults is illustrated 
by her inability to protect herself. It would be false to say that her 
autonomy would have been infringed if a bystander had offered 
assistance, rather, the opposite is true. Similarly, it denies the concept of 
relational autonomy to suggest that the accused's right to stand by and 
watch as another person is degraded is fundamental to individualism 
and, yet, this is precisely what the Anglo-Canadian law says. 
26 Prentice, supra note 1 at 36. 
27 V. Held, "Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View" in Science, A1ora/i(J! and Feminist 
Theo1y (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987) 111 at 114 [hereinafter Held]. 
2S /bic/., at 129 
29 J. Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thought and Possibilities" ( 1989) 1 
Yale J. of L. and Feminism 7 at 9 [hereinafter Nedelsky]. 
30 L. Bender, "Feminist Theory and Tort" (1988) 38 J. of Legal Education 3 at 34. 
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iii Positive and Negative Liberties and Rights 
Another libertarian claim made in opposition to a duty to rescue is 
grounded in the distinction between positive and negative liberties and 
rights. Essentially, this argument suggests that, 
a liberal political order is based on the protection of negative liberty 
(freedom fom interference or coercion) rather than positive liberty 
(freedom to, or self-determination), and on the protection of negative 
rights (rights against interference by others) rather than positive rights 
(rights to receive something from others ... ).31 
In short, the contention is that, "the imposition of an affirmative duty to 
rescue ... violate[s] the liberal values at the core of our legal order."32 
The above critique represents a misunderstanding of traditional 
liberal theorists. For theorists such as Locke, the concept of liberty 
included both positive and negative elements: liberty is the freedom to 
act as one wishes, without interference from others.33 One of the key 
aspects of liberty is positive in nature: people have the freedom to act in 
furtherance of their own self-interest; they have the right of self-
determination. The protection of certain positive liberties in the 
traditional liberal framework makes it less problematic to advocate for a 
positive right such as a duty to rescue. A duty to rescue can simply be 
characterized as an extension of the positive elements inherent in the 
liberal concept of liberty. 
Further, even if a duty to rescue would undermine the liberal values 
that lie at the core of our legal system, the duty should still be established 
in criminal law. Perhaps the law has traditionally chosen to protect only 
negative liberties and rights because it is a product of a male-dominated 
society and, therefore, represents notions of libe1ty that are essentially 
male. According to MacKinnon, "[t]he liberal state coercively and 
authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a 
gender.''34 By only protecting negative liberties and rights, the law 
31 S. J. Heyman, "Foundations of the Duty to Rescue" (1994) 47 Vand. L. Rev. 673 at 708 
[hereinafter Heyman]. For a more thorough discussion of positive and negative libetties see S. 
J. Heyman, "Positive and Negative Liberty" (1992) 68 Chic.-Kent L. Rev. 81. 
32 Heyman, /bid., at 707. 
33 J. Locke, Two Treatises cf Govemment, 3d. ed., ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1988) vol.2 at s.4. 
34 C. MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist The01y o/!he State (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988) 
at 162. 
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suggests that people do not need the state to safeguard positive liberties 
and rights. While this may be the case for men, it is not the case for 
women. 
For example, a man who is attacked by another man typically has a 
reasonable chance of defending himself without the aid of others. As the 
state protects the man's right to be free from interference from another 
person (a negative right), the man is able to act in self-defence against 
the aggressor without criminal culpability. Thus, the protection of 
negative liberty works to the attacked man's benefit. In contrast, a 
woman who is attacked by a man has almost no chance of escaping 
simply because he will be stronger and will physically overpower her. 
Unlike the man, legal protection of the woman's negative right to be free 
from interference and the corresponding right to act in self-defence does 
little to protect the woman. Rather, the woman only has a reasonable 
chance of escaping harm if someone else comes to her aid; something 
not required by law. In practice, then, the law does not protect female 
victims to the same extent that it protects male victims. 35 This failure to 
protect positive liberties and rights, such as a duty to rescue, allows men 
to perpetrate violent crimes against women more easily. Thus, the 
liberal political order, in this instance at least, ignores the perspective of 
female victims of crime. 
Given the ideological weight of this argument, it seems that any 
society claiming to be egalitarian must re-evaluate the male-oriented 
concepts of liberty that underlie its legal system. It is submitted that the 
law should move towards incorporating concepts of liberty that do not 
fall neatly into the liberal tradition, but which more adequately serve the 
interests of women. Such a concept of liberty would involve 
understanding and recognizing in law the relationships that we all share 
with one another and the rights that result from these interconnections.36 
This would involve giving weight to positive liberties and rights, and 
calling upon others to heed their responsibility to their fellow citizens. 
35 Ibid., at 164. MacKinnon states that: 
[p ]hilosophically, this posture [of judicial passivity or impartiality] is 
expressed in the repeated constitutional invocation of the superiority of 
negative freedom ... over positive legal affimrntions .... The state that 
pursues this value [of negative libe1iy] promotes freedom when it does not 
intervene with the social status quo. 
36 Nedelsky, supra note 29. 
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Whilethis may seem to break with liberal theory, it is a departure that is 
needed in order to make the law more accountable to women. 
iv. Robbing Rescuers of Their Moral 
A further claim against imposition of a duty to rescue is that 
criminalization will rob the Good Samaritan of his/her claim to moral 
praise.37 The fear is that with criminalization, society will fail to 
recognize the rescuer's actions as a free moral choice worthy of praise 
and emulation and, rather, will reduce his/her actions to attempts to 
avoid criminal culpability. 38 
While this argument may be of some philosophical interest, it is 
divorced from any real practical value. First, criminalization of a failure 
to rescue would hardly rob the Good Samaritan of the moral praise that 
he/she deserves. Just because a person could potentially face criminal 
culpability for failing to rescue does not imply that a rescuer's actions 
are any less moral. 39 Criminalization simply suggests that failing to 
rescue a person who is in the midst of intense victimization is wrong, 
and it is illogical to conclude from this that the actions of someone who 
does rescue are, as a result, less right. In fact, imposing a duty to rescue 
would actually reflect society's acknowledgment of rescuing as moral 
and good, so much so that people who did not act in this way would be 
recognized by society as criminally culpable. 
Second, even if one concedes that implementing a duty to rescue 
would decrease the moral virtue of the rescuer's actions, this may not be 
wholly negative. As mentioned below, one of the benefits of a positive 
duty to rescue is that it characterizes the actions of rescuers as normal 
and rational, instead of extraordinary or itTational. When society holds a 
Good Samaritan up as a super-hero, they are implicitly suggesting that 
his/her actions are atypical or beyond the scope of normal human 
interaction. For example, if Dunlop or Sylvester would have intervened 
in the assault against Brenda Ross, it is likely that society would have 
deemed them heroes and would have been astonished at their bravery 
and compassion. Idealization of the Good Samaritan is not necessarily 
37 A. D. Woozley, "A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability" (1983) 69 
Virginia L. Rev. 1273 at 1292 [hereinafter Woozley] referring to the remarks of Elizabeth 
Wolgast, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Meeting (March 1981 ). 
3s Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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entirely positive. It suggests that "normal" people are not expected to 
help others. Perhaps imposing a duty to rescue through the Code would 
suggest that rational and normal people are expected to act to the benefit 
of people experiencing violence. This would have the effect of 
prompting more rescues and possibly reducing the harm associated with 
violent crimes. 
Finally, the concrete benefits associated with a positive duty to 
rescue far outweigh philosophical claims regarding the deprivation of 
praise for the rescuer.40 In short, who cares ifthe rescuer is robbed of his 
or her claim to moral virtue so long as there will be less harm associated 
with violent crime and the criminal justice system will be more 
accountable to female victims of violence? Focusing on the rescuer's 
claim to moral recognition obscures the essential reason for imposing a 
positive duty to rescue: potential benefits for the victim. 
v. Practical D!lficulties 
Finally, while some scholars seem prepared to concede the 
theoretical benefits associated with a duty to rescue, many see practical 
difficulty with its implementation. 41 How proximate would the 
bystander have to be in order to be culpable? How long would he/she 
have to remain at the scene of the primary offence to be charged? How 
long would a rescuer have to continue assistance and at what risk? What 
if he/she was paralyzed by fear - would he/she still be guilty of failing to 
rescue? How reasonable would his/her assessment of whether or not a 
criminal assault was occun-ing have to be? 
While these concerns are valid, they do not provide adequate 
justification for persistence of the no duty to act rule. Indeed, it is always 
difficult to create workable standards when implementing criminal 
culpability, but this is not a reason to allow morally reprehensible 
behaviour to go unpunished. It simply suggests that legislators must be 
careful when drafting a duty to rescue provision, and that a fact-based, 
case-by-case analysis of the issues must ensue.42 Furthe1more, it may be 
40 The benefits associated with a positive duty to rescue are discussed in more detail in the 
following section. Mentioning some of the benefits associated with a duty to rescue is only 
meant to highlight the problematic nature of the claim being discussed. 
41 Seagraves, supra note 25 at 1256-65, n.205. 
42 A good example of a Code provision that has been clarified through a case-by-case 
analysis is s.21 (I) supra note I 0. For example, the word "purpose" in subsection (b) was 
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possible to rely on police discretion in determining when the accused's 
conduct is intended to be covered by the legislation. 
Proof that such legislation is practicable may be seen in other 
jurisdictions. A statutory duty to rescue exists in many American 
states,43as well as European countries such as Italy,44 Poland,45 France,46 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in R. v. Htobert, (1995) 40 C.R. (4th) 141 and Greyeyes, 
supra note 16. Further, the word "effect" in subsection (b) was interpreted in R. v. 1Worga11, 
(1993) 80 C.C.C. 9 (3d) 16 at 21. 
43 See Emergency Medical Care Act, 12 Vt. Ann. Stat. Tit. s. 519 (1967) [hereinafter 
Vem10nt] which states that: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm 
shall to the extent the same can be rendered without danger or peril to 
himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, 
give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance 
or care is being provided by others. 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with 
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless 
his acts constitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects 
to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall 
alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the 
healing arts committed in the ordinary course of his practice. 
(c) A Person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be 
fined not more that $100.00 
See also Good Samaritan Law, 218 Minn. Stat. s.604.05 (1982) [hereinafter Minnesota] 
which states that: 
Subdivision 1. Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency 
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave 
physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger 
to peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. 
Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid 
from law enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates this 
section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 
Subd. 2. General immunity from liability. Any person who, without 
compensation or the expectation of compensation renders emergency care, 
advice, or assistance at the scene of an emergency or during transit to a 
location where professional medical care can be rendered, is not liable for 
any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by that person in 
rendering the emergency care, advice, or assistance unless that person acts 
in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or 
assistance ... 
See also 268 Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. s. 40 ( 1983) [hereinafter Massachusetts] which provides 
that: 
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, 
murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime 
shall, to the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to 
himself or others, report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement 
official as soon as reasonably practicable. Any person who violates this 
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Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey.47 Obviously, these jurisdictions 
felt that it was possible to create workable standards in regards to a duty 
to rescue. 48 For example, the French courts have clarified many aspects 
section shall be punished by fine of not less than five hundred nor more than two 
thousand and five hundred dollars. 
See also R.I. Gen. Law s.11-37-3.l [hereinafter Rhode Island] which states that: 
Duty to Report: Any person, other than the victim, who know or has 
reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first degree 
sexual assault is taking place in his/her presence shall immediately notify 
the state police or the police department of the city or town in which said 
assault or attempted assault is taking place of said crime. 
44 The America11 Series of Foreig11 Penal Codes: l!alicm Pe11al Code, trans. E. Wise & A. 
Maitlan (Littleton: Rothman & Co., 1978) vol. 23 at 199. Article 592 of the Italian Penal Code 
states: 
Failure to Render Assistance ... 
Anyone, finding a human body which is or appears to be lifeless, or a 
person who is wounded or otherwise in peril, who fails to provide 
necessary assistance or to give immediate notice to authorities, shall be 
subject to [imprisonment for up to three months or to a fine of up to 120, 
000 lire]. 
If such behaviour on the part of the offender results in personal injury, the 
punishment shall be increased; if it results in death, the punishment shall 
be doubled. 
45 The American Series(}/ Foreign Penal Codes: The Polish Peoples Republic Penal Code, 
trans. W. Kenney, & T, Sadowsky (South Hackensack: Rothman & Co., 1973) vol. 19 at 80. 
Article 164 of the Polish Penal Code states: 
s.1. Whoever does not render assistance to a person who is in a situation 
threatening immediate danger of loss of life, a serious bodily injmy, or 
serious impairment of health, when he could render assistance without 
exposing himself or anther person to the danger of loss of life or serious 
harm to health, shall be subject to a penalty of deprivation of liberty for up 
to 3 years. 
46 J. Bell, S. Boyron, & S. Whittaker, Principles(}/ French Law(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) 
at 219 [hereinafter Bell]. Article 223-6, al.2 of the French Criminal Code states: 
Whoever voluntarily abstains from giving assistance to a person in danger 
is liable to [5 years in prison or a fine of 500, 000 F], if they could have 
done so without risk to themselves or to a third-party, either by personal 
actions or by summoning assistance. 
47 Seagraves, supra note 25 at 1281. 
48 Unfortunately, while many American jurisdictions have implemented a duty to rescue, 
there has not been much case law surrounding these statutes (see Seagreaves, supra note 25 at 
1276). The limited use that the American jurisdictions have made of their Good Samaritan 
laws is slightly problematic in that these laws have the real ability to capture morally 
repugnant acts such as those outlined in Dunlop and Clarkson, and should be used to impose 
criminal sanction in such situations. European jurisdictions have been more willing to charge 
those who fail to rescue and have, therefore, made more progress in clarifying the cases where 
a duty to rescue would apply. 
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of their duty to rescue legislation.49 The danger that the victim faces 
must be of imminent death or serious injury in order for the potential 
rescuer to be culpable.50 In this regard, the French courts have held that a 
person who does not rescue in the case of sexual assault is guilty of 
failing to rescue.51 Further, while it has been clarified that the offender 
must be subjectively aware of the danger and know that their 
intervention is necessary, the intervention itself need not be heroic.52 
Analysis of the French case law suggests that it is possible to develop 
workable standards for a duty to rescue in order to clarify where such a 
duty would apply. There is no reason why the Canadian courts could not 
proceed also with a case-by-case analysis to overcome the practical 
difficulties of implementing a duty to rescue. 
A TO RESCUE 
Like those who oppose a duty to rescue, those who advocate for its 
implementation have a range of arguments in support of their position. 
The main justification hinges on public policy considerations. A duty to 
rescue creates an incentive to help others and has the potential to 
decrease the hann associated with violent crime. Consider the cases of 
Dunlop and Clarkson: if any of the people in the vicinity of the assaults 
had been sympathetic to the victim's situation, a criminal statute 
imposing a positive duty to rescue may have been the last nudge forcing 
them to take positive action to help the victim. This would have 
decreased the psychological and physical harm associated with 
multiple-party sexual assault. Moreover, a positive duty to rescue would 
imply that rescues should not be viewed as unusual heroics but, rather, 
as autonomous, rational, and ordinary behaviour. Once people alter their 
perception of rescues as acts committed by super-heroes, it is possible 
that more "ordinary" people will undertake to help others who are being 
victimized. 
49 Bell, supra note 46. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See Bourges, 21June1990, Droir Penal 1991, 135. 
52 Bell, sl!pra note 46. 
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Further, a duty to rescue is more aligned with the current moral 
values of Canadian society. As mentioned above, Butler suggests that 
most Canadians would not tolerate other people watching people being 
degraded and/or dehumanized.53 While Butler arose in the context of 
pornographic videos, it follows that most Canadians would be even 
more appalled at the possibility that someone would escape criminal 
liability for actually watching a multiple-party sexual assault, murder, or 
assault. Thus, a failure to rescue provision would more adequately 
represent the morality of Canadian citizens. 
Moreover, a positive duty to rescue makes people accountable for 
their actions (or inaction) and, thereby forces people to take 
responsibility for their choices. The Good Samaritan's dilemma can be 
characterized in stark terms: had Dunlop rescued Ross, she may not have 
been harmed; but since he did not act, she was harmed.54 Given that 
Dunlop chose not to help Ross, does it follow that he is partly 
responsible for the hann that resulted? The answer is yes, Ross' s harm 
was a direct consequence of Dunlop's choice not to rescue. In effect, 
Dunlop allowed Ross to be victimized. 55 While this logic may seem 
overly simple, it is too clear to ignore. Why should criminal sanctions 
not follow for Dunlop's behaviour? Indeed, his inaction caused, or at 
least contributed to, Ross's hann in a real and tangible way. 
Finally, a positive duty to rescue would more adequately account 
for the victims' perspective and would make the criminal justice system 
more accountable to survivors of violence. As mentioned above, in 
situations of multiple-party sexual assault it is highly probable that 
victims are deeply affected by the presence of bystanders and voyeurs.56 
Survivors of sexual violence should be able to use the law as a method of 
pursuing justice against those who watched as they were degraded. 
Perhaps this would have the effect of increasing survivors' faith in the 
criminal justice system by shifting the starting point of the inquiry from 
the male bystander to the female person who was invaded. 57 Indeed, 
53 Butler, supra note 17 at 4 79. 
54 Woozley, sl!pra note 37 at 1285. Note that the problem can also be more realistically 
characterized as follows: if Dunlop had rescued Ross, she would have been harmed less; but 
since Dunlop did not act, Ross was harmed more. 
55 /bid. 
56 Bownes, supra note 6. 
57 P. Hughes, "From a Women's Point of View'' (1993) 42 U.N.B.L.J. 341at343. 
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imposing culpability on every person who was involved in the 
degradation of the victim would signal that the justice system takes 
seriously the reality of multiple-party sexual assault. It is possible that 
more women will report incidents of sexual assault if they knew that all 
of the people who were involved in their victimization would be 
criminally culpable. The increased reporting that would result from 
imposition of a positive duty to rescue would have a positive impact on 
society as a whole since more violent offenders would be brought to 
justice. 
IV. FORMULATION OF THE RULE 
Z: Criminal Culpabt!ity or Tort Liabtlity? 
Despite the reluctance of Anglo-Canadian law to recognize duties 
to rescue, Parliament must implement such a duty in order to protect 
victims of violence and, in particular, victims of multiple-party sexual 
assault. While much of the academic literature surrounding duty to 
rescue centres on tort law, this paper has suggested implementing this 
duty through the Criminal Code. 58 Before proceeding with formulation 
of the proposed Code provision, it is helpful to explain the advantages 
associated with a criminal charge over civil liability in tort. 
First, criminal law has a strong moral element that is lacking in tort 
law. Tort law is a method of balancing interests in society; the plaintiff's 
security interest is weighed against the defendant's freedom to act. In 
this way, there is no moralizing per se in tort law; one does not say that 
the tortfeasor was wrong but, rather, that the plaintiff deserves 
compensation. 59 As a result, potential liability in tort can be 
characterized as one of the many costs that must be considered when a 
58 Under the tort rnbric, the victim or the victim's family can bring a civil action against any 
person who did not offer reasonable assistance to the victim. If the victim or the victim's 
family wins the action, they are awarded damages. In contrast, a criminal charge is brought by 
the State. The victim is not a party to the action and does not usually receive any monetary 
compensation. 
59 R.F.V. Heuston & R. A. Buckley, eds., Salmond and Heus/011 on !he Law q/Torls, 21st 
ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996) at 23. "The object of a civil inquiry into cause and 
consequence is to fix liability on some responsible person and to give reparation for damage 
done, not to inflict punishment for duty disregarded." 
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person decides to act in a certain way. In contrast, criminal law has a 
strong moral element. When you commit a crime, society condemns 
your actions as wrong. Watching women who are being repeatedly 
assaulted is a crime, not a tort. It is illogical to talk about balancing the 
legitimate interest of watching a woman being sexually degraded 
against the woman's interest in being rescued. In short, criminal law, as 
opposed to tort, is able to send a message to the voyeur that his actions 
will not be tolerated by society. 
Second, criminal law has the advantage of being a public forum, 
while tort law is inherently private. The dispute between civil litigants is 
characterized as an individualized conflict, the plaintiff versus the 
defendant. In contrast, criminal charges are public; the Crown represents 
the interests of society. It is dangerous to portray voyeurism in multiple-
party sexual assault (or other violent crimes) as an individualized 
conflict between the victim and the bystander. When a man watches a 
sexual assault and fails to offer assistance, he is doing more than just 
harming the victim. He is perpetuating the myth that women are objects 
for men to watch and derive pleasure from. Such behaviour is morally 
destructive to all members of society. More generally, women have 
battled long and hard to have issues of gender-specific violence 
addressed in the public sphere. If women are ever to attain equality 
within the Canadian society, issues involving gender-specific violence 
must continue to be addressed in a forum that is capable of sending a 
public message to potential offenders. 
Third, as mentioned above, it is widely recognized that the 
Canadian criminal justice system is not accountable to female victims of 
sexual assault. A duty to rescue provision in the Code has the potential 
to make the system more aligned with women's interests. In turn, it may 
increase the percentage of women who report sexual assaults. In 
contrast, civil remedies are unlikely to result in increased reporting of 
sexual assaults to police; this is because women can bring tort actions 
for failure to rescue even if no criminal charges are laid. 
The most persuasive argument in favour of a duty to rescue in tort 
is that there is potential for the plaintiff to receive monetary 
compensation from the tortfeasor. In contrast, there would be little or no 
compensation for the victim under a failure to rescue provision. While 
this is a compelling argument in favour of tort liability, it does not make 
up for the serious problems noted above, especially when we consider 
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that v1ctnns of crime can apply for compensation through legislation 
such as Ontario's Compensation far Victims of' Crime Act.60 Therefore, 
while it is tempting to argue for a tort of failure to rescue because of the 
possibility of monetary compensation, to do so would be to ignore the 
many disadvantages associated with to1i liability. These disadvantages 
include the doctrinal framework of balancing of interests, the inherently 
private nature of tort disputes, and the fact that tort remedies do not 
necessarily increase the rate of reporting for sexual assault. Instead, a 
criminal provision should be enacted and victims be directed to seek 
compensation from existing victim's compensation statutes.61 
ii Guidance fi,om other Jurisdictions 
As mentioned previously, there are many common law 
jurisdictions that have imposed a duty to rescue through their penal 
code. Analysis of a number of duty to rescue provisions in American 
jurisdictions indicates that formulation of such a rnle must take into 
account a number of factors. First, the rule must be defined nan-owly so 
as to only capture behaviour that is morally repugnant and worthy of 
criminalization, therefore, any proposed legislation should only impose 
liability for failing to rescue at the scene of a violent crime.62 A person 
should not be penalized for failing to rescue in situations involving 
minor physical hann such as a small scuffle or the like. Of course, as 
with any criminal statute, one must rely on police discretion in charging. 
The police should bear in mind what so1i of activity the statute is aiming 
to capture and lay charges accordingly. 
Second, while the rule cannot be overbroad, it must still be 
effective enough to cover the acts contemplated in such cases as Dunlop 
and Clarkson. For this reason, the statute should require rescue where a 
reasonable person in the circumstances would know that a violent crime 
60 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.24. This legislation allows for compensation up to $25, 000 for victims 
of violent crime who have been injured or killed. A claim must be filed within one year after 
the date of injury or death, and will be assessed before the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board. Similar legislation also exists in other provinces. 
61 It has been widely acknowledged that victim's compensation statutes do not provide 
adequate monetary compensation to victims of crime. While this is a valid criticism, it 
suggests that the government should allocate more financial resources into compensating 
victims, not necessarily that victims should turn to civil remedies. 
62 See Vermont, sNpra note 43; and Minnesota, supra note 43. 
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is taking place. It should not be possible for a person to be acquitted 
simply because he/she does not have the perceptions of a reasonable 
person. For example, it should not be open for accused persons such as 
those encountered in Dunlop or Clarkson to claim that they sincerely did 
not think that a multiple-party sexual assault was occurring and, rather, 
that they honestly believed that the victim was consenting to the 
repeated acts of intercourse. 63 Instead, the offender should be judged 
according to perceptions of a reasonable person in the circumstances. 64 
Only an objective standard has the ability to punish those who fail to 
rescue in situations of multiple-party sexual assault. It does not allow 
offenders to hide behind, for example, outdated and patriarchal thinking 
regarding women, heterosexuality, and consent. Moreover, an objective 
fault element is more aligned with the victim's interests. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that it would make any difference to the women in Dunlop or 
Clarkson whether the men watching them honestly believed that they 
were engaged in consensual intercourse due to some outdated notion of 
women's sexuality, or because they actually knew that the women were 
being assaulted. The fact remains, these men watched while these 
women were being objectified and humiliated; their presence at the 
crime and their failure to act decreased the likelihood of escaping and 
increased the likelihood of harm.65 Only an objective fault element 
allows the law to capture morally repugnant acts effectively while 
maintaining the integrity of the victim. 
Third, the duty to rescue must take into account the volatile nature 
of violent situations and the risks facing potential rescuers.66 A rescuer 
should only be under a legal duty to rescue if he/she could do so without 
harming him/herself in the process. Such a limitation makes sense for a 
number of reasons. Foremost, as a general rule, a statute should not 
63 Problems associated with unreasonable but honest beliefs in consent have been 
encountered in such cases as R. v. Pappajohn [1980], 2 S.C.R. 120 and Sansregrel v. The 
Queen [1985], I S.C.R. 570. For a feminist analysis of the Pappajohn rule see T. Pickard, 
"Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn" (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 415. 
64 Traditionally, the reasonable person was equated to the man of ordinaiy prudence. The 
use of the word "man" is purposeful and suggests the gendered history of the term. Of course, 
when the term reasonable person is used in this paper it is meant to refer to a genderless person 
with ordinaiy sensibilities. 
65 Bownes, supra note 6. 
66 See Vermont, supra note 43; Minnesota, supra note 43; and Massachusetts, st!piYl note 
43. 
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compel a person to undergo physical harm, in fact, to do so likely would 
be a violation of s.7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 67 
Furthermore, a rescue attempt is relatively useless if the rescuer is 
injured in the process of attempting to give aid, and this may even make 
matters worse. Therefore, the duty to rescue should be limited to 
situations where a rescue attempt will not hann the rescuer. 
Fourth, the proposed statute should also acknowledge that attempts 
to rescue need not involve direct interference in the violent act. 68 It 
would be unreasonable to require a potential rescuer to use physical 
force to intervene in a multiple-party sexual assault. In fact, in the case 
of group violence, the rescuer could make the situation worse if he/she 
did intervene by inadvertently encouraging the aggressors or by 
becoming another potential victim. Instead, the statute should only call 
for reasonable assistance given the circumstances. Often times, this 
would simply mean calling 9-1-1, asking for help from passers-by, or 
administering first aid if possible. Thus, it would be relatively easy for a 
conscientious citizen to escape liability for failure to rescue; in fact, the 
actions required by the provision would often be what a reasonable 
person would do even if the legislation did not exist. 
Fifth, given the growing amount of civil malpractice litigation, the 
legislation should follow many American jurisdictions and absolve the 
rescuer of all civil liability.69 It only seems fair that a person who 
responds to the needs of another person who is in the midst of a criminal 
attack should not be faced with a potential lawsuit as a result of his/her 
actions. Moreover, the incentive to rescue would be diminished if a 
rescuer faced possible civil liability; many people may choose not to 
rescue and face criminal charges rather than exposing themselves to 
civil liability. Such a result counters one of the main purposes of a duty 
to rescue provision, which is to encourage socially useful behaviour that 
decreases the harm associated with violent crime. 
Unfortunately, due to the nature of Canada's federalist state, it is 
not within federal jurisdiction to enact a provision that shields a person 
against civil liability. While criminal law does fall within federal 
67 Ca11adia11 Charter of Rights a11d Freedoms, Part I of the Constit11tio11 Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, s.7 [hereinafter the Charted. 
68 See Minnesota, supra note 43; Massachusetts, supra note 43; and Rhode Island, s11pra 
note 43. 
69 See Vermont, s11pra note 43. 
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jurisdiction under s.91(27) of the Co11stitutio11 Act, 1867, it is unlikely 
that a subsection which limited civil liability against a rescuer would be 
constitutional. While the Crown may try to argue that limiting civil 
liability is necessarily incidental to the federal scheme it is unlikely that 
this argument would be successful.70 In short, limiting civil liability 
interferes too directly with existing common law and statutory 
provisions which fall exclusively within provincial jurisdiction to be 
considered necessarily incidental. Instead, it would be open to the 
provincial and federal governments to cooperate to absolve the rescuer 
of civil liability by allowing each province to volunteer to implement a 
policy package that falls within their jurisdiction. We can also hope that 
the judiciary would be sensitive to the defendant's case if a lawsuit was 
brought against him/her for negligence while rescuing the plaintiff. It 
seems that policy consideration would weigh against imposing liability 
in such a case. 
Sixth, the proposed statute should attempt to respect the victim's 
rights as much as possible, especially in the instances of sexual assault. 71 
There has been an attempt throughout this paper to recognize that 
women who are sexually assaulted often see the criminal justice system 
as a second form of victimization. While the proposal to implement a 
duty to rescue is intended to mark a positive change in the law towards 
incorporation of the victim's perspective, in some cases it may actually 
alienate the victim further. For example, a woman may be weary of 
being questioned on the witness stand and may want to focus on 
recovery. As a result, she may not wish to testify in connection with 
charges against those who failed to rescue. There is also the possibility 
that the person who watched her victimization may be a family member 
or ex-partner and she may not want to have him/her charged. In light of 
this paper's emphasis on the need for the criminal justice system to 
become more accountable to the victim, a woman's requests for certain 
people not to be charged under the proposed statute should be respected. 
While this sort of stipulation is unprecedented within our Code, it is 
70 The necessary incidental doctrine was argued in Gel!era/ Jli'otors (}fCa11acla Ltd v. City 
Natio11al Leasing [ 1989] 1 SCR 641. 
71 See Rhode Island, supra note 43 at s.11-37-3.2 which provides that: 
No person shall be charged under s. I 1-37-3.1 unless and until the police 
department investigating the incident obtains from the victim a signed 
complaint against the person alleging a violation of s.11-37-3.1. 
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needed to accomplish one of the major goals of the statute, namely, to 
make the Code more accountable to women. 
Finally, bearing in mind that the offence of failing to rescue would 
be less blameworthy than the underlying offence being committed, the 
punishment should be relatively lenient. For example, while a sexual 
assault conviction has a maximum sentence of ten years, the failure to 
rescue provision should have a considerably less severe sentence. The 
message sent to the offender should be that, while his/her actions are not 
as blameworthy as actually committing a sexual assault, he/she is still 
morally accountable. Moreover, the punishment should also be variable 
according to the moral blameworthiness of the accused. The situations 
of on-lookers in Dunlop and Clarkson are definitely more shocking than 
that of a stranger who witnesses a fistfight and decides not to inform the 
local authorities. The proposed failure to rescue provision should be able 
to accommodate these varying degrees of moral fault by being 
formulated as a hybrid offence. The police should have the discretion to 
charge the accused with an indictable offence or summary conviction. 
An indictable offence would reflect the repugnant acts of voyeurs in 
situations of multiple-party sexual assault, while a summaiy conviction 
may be appropriate in less morally repugnant situation. 
iii. The Provision 
In light of all of the considerations outlined above, it is submitted 
that Parliament should enact a provision in the Cnininal Code as 
follows: 
( 1) Failure to Rescue - Every person commits an offence who is 
present at the scene of a violent crime where a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would know that another person is 
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm, and fails to 
give reasonable assistance to that person. 
(2) Meaning of "reasonable assistance" - For the purposes of 
this section, reasonable assistance is that which can be given 
without danger or peril to the rescuer or others, and includes 
obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or 
medical personnel. 
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(3) Application - Where the accused fails to give reasonable 
assistance to a person who was sexually assaulted, the 
complainant will be asked to consent to the charge against the 
accused before it will be laid. 
(4) Punishment - Every person who commits an offence under 
subsection (1) is guilty of: 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years; 
(b) an offense punishable on summary conviction. 
iv. The implications q/'the Proposed Statute 
After formulating a rule for the duty to rescue, it is interesting to 
apply the rule in the situations represented by Dunlop and Clarkson. Of 
course, to proceed with the analysis it must be assumed that both of the 
victims of the sexual assaults in these cases would consent to charges 
being laid against those who watched as they were assaulted. First, it 
would be up to the Crown to establish the actus reus for the offence. 
That is, the Crown must establish that the accused were present at the 
scene of a crime where someone was exposed to, or had suffered, grave 
physical harm, and failed to offer reasonable assistance. In Dunlop, it is 
obvious that the men who were standing near the creek while the victim 
was being held down and sexually assaulted can be said to have 
completed the actus reus. What about Dunlop and Sylvester? It could be 
forcefully argued that the fact that the sexual assaults were taking place 
within their view and that they did nothing to aid the victim establishes 
the actus reus of the offence. In Clarkson, the voyeurs who watched as 
the German woman was sexually assaulted are definitely within the 
scope of liability envisioned in this offence through their physical 
proximity to the events. 
Having established the actus reus, we now tum to mens rea. The 
relevant question here is whether or not it can be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that that a reasonable person in the circumstances 
would have known that the woman being sexually assaulted was at risk 
of, or had suffered, grave physical harm. In the case of Dunlop, the 
surrounding factors in the case suggest that the mens rea is met. For 
example, the accused knew that the members of the Spartans had just 
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met Ross earlier in the evening. They also knew that alcohol was being 
consumed; in fact, they were responsible for delivering alcohol to the 
site of the sexual assault. Further, Ross was being held down as others 
were having intercourse with her. It can be inferred that a reasonable 
person in these circumstances would know that a multiple-party sexual 
assault was taking place, and that sexual assault has the potential to 
cause grave physical harm. 
In Clarkson, the trial judge found that the onlookers were aware 
that the acts of intercourse they were witnessing were non-consensual 
and were, in fact, voyeurs. 72 A reasonable person in these circumstances 
would know that sexual assault has the potential to cause extreme 
physical hann to the victim, especially when more than one man is 
assaulting the woman. Therefore, the Crown could easily establish the 
mens rea requirement in Clarkson. 
These two examples suggest that the proposed provision imposing 
a positive duty to rescue would likely make the morally reprehensible 
actions of those accused in Dunlop and Clarkson criminally culpable. 
This would mark a positive step forward for victims of multiple-party 
sexual assault. As illustrated, the new provision more adequately 
addresses the reality of the situations faced by victims and the 
blameworthy nature of the actions of bystanders in such situations. It 
does so by imposing criminal sanctions for such behaviour and, thereby, 
sending a message that such inaction will not be tolerated. 
v. POSSIBLE CHARTER CHALLENGES 
i Section 7· Life, Liberty and Security <?/the Person 
An accused in a situation similar to Dunlop and Sylvester today 
would likely argue that a failure to rescue provision is unconstitutional 
under s.7. 73 Section seven states that: "Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." The 
accused may take the position that a positive duty to rescue violates s. 7 
by imposing an objective standard of fault coupled with possible 
72 C!arkso11, supra note 14 at 347. 
73 Charter, supra note 67 at s.7. 
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imprisonment. The standard of fault is objective since the accused is 
required to rescue in cases where a "reasonable person in the 
circumstances would know that another person is exposed to, or has 
suffered, grave physical harm." In R v. Vaillancourt, 74R v. Martineau, 75 
R. v. DeSousa, 76 and R. v. Creighton,77 the Supreme Court of Canada 
confirmed its position that the mental element of a crime must 
correspond to its moral blameworthiness. In particular, the stigma and 
punishment associated with the offence must be considered when 
assessing the constitutionally required fault element. 
In Creighton, the Comi held that stigma is determined by the 
answer of two questions. First, is the conduct of "sufficient gravity to 
import moral opprobrium on the individual found guilty of engaging in 
such conduct"?78 Second, what is the "moral blameworthiness not of the 
offence, but of the offender found guilty of committing it"?79 In response 
to the first question, failing to rescue is not conduct that would likely be 
considered worthy of moral opprobrium since a failure to rescue 
involves peripheral hann to the victim (psychological hann through 
voyeurism) rather than direct harm (physical harm through sexual 
assault). In relation to the second question regarding the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender, most Canadians still regard rescuing 
behaviour as atypical and beyond the scope of normal human 
interaction. Therefore, it is likely that the typical Canadian would view 
the actions of the accused in Dunlop with a degree of sympathy; he/she 
might be repulsed by the actions of the accused but would pity the 
accuseds' lack of heroism. The answers to the two questions regarding 
stigma suggest that, while there would be a slight stigma attached to a 
person convicted of failure to rescue, such a stigma would not approach 
the opprobrium suffered by those who knowingly and intentionally 
engage in the principle offence. 
Finally, in determining the constitutionally required fault element, 
the court must consider the punishment associated with the provision in 
question. In this case, the punishment associated with a failure to rescue 
14 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636. 
75 [1990] 58 S.C.R. 633. 
76 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944. 
77 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter O·eighto11]. 
78 !Nd., at 19. 
79 ibid. 
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is hybrid and, therefore, variable depending on the moral 
blameworthiness of the particular circumstances. It is possible that in 
situations such as Dunlop and Clarkson, the accused would be charged 
with the indictable offence under the failure to rescue provision. 
However, in less extreme scenarios, an accused might only be charged 
with the summary offence. Therefore, subjective mens rea is not 
constitutionally required on this ground and, therefore, it is unlikely that 
the accused would be successful in arguing that objective fault was 
unconstitutional for failure to rescue. 
Defence counsel may also argue that, since the failure to rescue 
provision requires the accused to undertake a positive act, it interferes 
with his/her liberty interest. The liberty interest protects a narrow sphere 
of personal autonomy in which individuals may make fundamentally 
and inherently private choices without state interference. 80 However, as 
argued in Section II, the right to standby as another person is victimized 
does not go to the very nature of freedom; this would be tantamount to 
saying that the onlookers in Dunlop and Clarkson had an inherent right 
to watch idly as a woman was sexually assaulted. Moreover, if we 
embrace feminist conceptions of autonomy, then taking responsibility 
for people who are in situations of victimization would not decrease 
one's autonomy, but enhance it. 81 
Section 7 of the Charter clearly states that the accused's right to 
liberty can be limited if required by the principles of fundamental 
justice. The accused would likely argue that the limitation of his liberty 
is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because 
the failure to rescue provision is overbroad. In R v. Heywood the 
Supreme Comt suggested that, "the effect of overbreadth is that in some 
applications the law is arbitrary or disproportionate. "82 The defence 
would contend that, given that the main purpose of the provision is to 
reduce the harm associated with violent crime, the failure to rescue 
provision is overbroad since there are cases where those who do not 
have the ability to reduce the harm to the victim would remain 
criminally culpable. 
It is difficult to see how this claim can be accepted. It is hard to 
contemplate a violent crime scene where a victim would not benefit to 
80 Godbout v. Longueuil (C!M (1997), 219 N.R. I (S.C.C.). 
81 Nedelsky, supra note 29 at 11. 
82 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 at 793 [hereinafter Ht;F11·ood]. 
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some degree from being rescued, even if only to reduce the 
psychological trauma of the situation. Further, the failure to rescue 
provision only applies to a narrow set of circumstances that many of us 
will never even encounter; the duty is limited to violent crimes where a 
reasonable person would be aware of the threat of grave physical harm 
and faces no danger themselves. In R. v. Heywood the Supreme Court 
suggested that, 
In analyzing a statutory provision to detennine if it is overbroad, a 
measure of deference must be paid to the means selected by the 
legislature ... [it] must have the power to make policy choices. A court 
should not interfere with legislation merely because a judge might 
have chosen a different means of accomplishing the objective if her or 
she has been the legislator.83 
This legislation would reflect a policy decision and is constructed in 
fairly narrow terms and, thus, it is unlikely to be deemed overbroad. 
Indeed, the Crown could make a much stronger argument to 
suggest that the limitation of the accused's s. 7 right is actually m 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In R. v. 
Seaboyer, 84 it was held that the principles of fundamental justice include 
broader societal concerns and that the legislation in question must 
conform to the fundamental precepts which underlie our system of 
justice. As outlined in Section III, the failure to rescue provision 
addresses two concerns that may qualify as principles of fundamental 
justice. First, the proposed legislation would decrease the harm 
associated with violent crimes in our society; and second, the failure to 
rescue provision will make the criminal justice system more accountable 
to victims of violence. It is hard to argue that deterrence of criminal 
behaviour and accountability of the legal system to victims are not 
fundamental to our system of justice. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
failure to rescue provision would be deemed unconstitutional. 
iZ: Sectf 011 1: The Oakes Test 
Even though the above analysis makes it seem likely that the failure 
to rescue provision could pass Charter scrutiny, for the purposes of 
completeness it is helpful to consider what would happen if the 
si Ibid. 
84 (1991) 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C) at 385, McLachlin J. 
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provision was found to offend a substantive Charter right. In particular, 
it would remain to be seen whether it would survive under s.1 of the 
Charter, namely, the Oakes Test.s5 Section one states that: "The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society." The Oakes test is the method for justifying limitations of 
Charter rights. s6 
Given that the failure to rescue provision would be legislated in the 
Code, one would have to consider whether the objective behind the 
provision was both pressing and substantial. That is, the objective must 
be "of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally 
protected right or freedom."87 It seems that the objectives of decreasing 
the hann associated with violent crime and making the criminal justice 
system more accountable to victims are both pressing and substantial. 
These objectives go towards the protection of weaker parties in society, 
including women who are sexually degraded and dehumanized. Indeed, 
the court has already acknowledged this underlying goal as pressing and 
substantial in But!er.ss In that case, Sopinka J. stated that: 
85 R. v. Oakes [ 1986] 1 S.C.R. I 03. The author has chosen to scrutinize the proposed failure 
to rescue provision through use of the strict Oakes test, however, it is possible that the Court 
would use a less-strict fonnulation of the Oakes analysis as outlined in Edward Books and Art 
v. The Quee!I [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter Edward Books]. In Edward Books, Dickson 
C.J.C. suggested that the Oakes Test could be modified when the limitation of rights was due 
to respect for the inherent dignity of the individual, a commitment to justice and equality, and 
so on. In such cases, the "pressing and substantial objective" need only be an important 
objective, the "rational connection" need only be a reasonable connection and, finally, 
"minimal impairment" need only be satisfactory legislative effort. It seems that the 
justification of the failure to rescue provision may call for use of the modified Oakes analysis 
as envisioned in Edward Books. It is legislation aimed at criminalizing conduct that is 
dehumanizing to victims of violent crime and, thus, furthers respect for human dignity and a 
commitment to justice. In such a case, it would be significantly easier for the Crown to have 
the legislation upheld under s. l. 
86 It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has never justified the limitation of 
a s. 7 right through s. l of the Charter. While this does not mean that the Court cannot do so in 
the future, it does suggest that the Court has traditionally been very reluctant to place 
limitations on s.7 rights. The only Supreme Court Justice to suggest that a s.7 violation could 
be upheld under s. l was Justice McLachlin in her dissent in R v. Hess; R v. Nguyen, [ 1990] 
2 SCR 906 at 946-56. 
87 R. v. Big M Drug Marl Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 352. 
88 Butler, supra note 1 7 at 496-97. 
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there is a growing concern that the exploitation of women and 
children, depicted in publications and films can, in certain 
circumstances, lead to 'abject and servile victimization' ... [and that] 
[m]aterials portraying women as a class of objects for sexual 
exploitation and abuse have a negative impact on 'the individual's 
sense of self-worth and acceptance. ' 89 
In short, the majority of the Supreme Court believed that protecting 
women from the harm of sexual objectification was both pressing and 
substantial. 
Second, the first element of the three-pronged prop01iionality 
criterion must be considered. Namely, the failure to rescue provision 
must be rationally connected to its objective: there must be a rational 
connection between the objective of the law and the means used to 
achieve it. As stated above, the objective of the failure to rescue 
provision is twofold: 1) to decrease the harm associated with violent 
crime and, 2) to make the criminal justice system more accountable to 
victims of violence. The failure to rescue provision fmihers these 
objectives by, first, creating a responsibility in the Code for bystanders 
to help people who are exposed to violent crime, and thereby decreasing 
the likelihood of harm to the victim. And, second, by criminalizing the 
conduct of those who fail to offer reasonable assistance, the provision 
marks systemic recognition that victims of violence are harmed by the 
inaction of bystanders. This makes the system more accountable to 
victims. 
Of course, critics may argue that this reasoning is too simplistic, 
that it suggests an easy cause-effect relationship where there may not be 
one. For example, it may be argued that the provision does not actually 
compel those who witness a violent crime to offer assistance but, rather, 
creates an incentive to flee in order to avoid criminal culpability. 
Furthe1more, defence counsel may argue that it is impossible to assess 
how dangerous a rescue attempt may be at first glance. That is, while the 
rescuer may think that he/she can call the authorities with little or no risk 
the him/herself, he/she may be put at risk simply because he/she 
attempts to rescue. The attacker may attempt to inflict injury on the 
rescuer simply because he/she is calling the police and may be a 
cooperative witness in a future trial. Thus, the defence may argue that 
89 Ibid. at 497, quoting from the decision in R. v. Red Hot Video (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at 
8 (B.C.C.A). 
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the failure to rescue provision may actually increase the harm associated 
with violent crimes by involving a second potential victim, the rescuer. 
While these arguments may sound compelling, it is difficult to assess 
their merit without social science/expert evidence in the arena of 
psychological responses to issues such fear, violence, threats of 
culpability, and threats of apprehension. As a result, whether or not the 
provision is rationally connected to its objective depends on the concrete 
evidence that each side presents. In any case, it would appear that there 
is a strong case to be made in the Crown's favour. 90 
Assuming that the provision is rationally connected to its objective, 
the third step of the proportionality test would require that the provision 
be minimally impairing. Minimal impairment suggests that the law 
cannot impair the Charter right any more than necessaiy to achieve its 
objective. It is likely that defence counsel would again try to argue that 
provision in question is overbroad and, therefore, not minimally 
impairing. This argument would have little success under the minimal 
impairment rubric for the same reasons that the overbreadth argument 
failed under the s.7 analysis; namely, the provision only captures 
conduct that goes towards its objective of decreasing the harm 
associated with violent crimes. Moreover, the ease by which an accused 
could dispel culpability for failing to rescue, for example by calling 
emergency services on a cell phone, illustrates the minute degree to 
which this provision impairs his Charter right. 
The strongest argument in the defence's favour would be for 
counsel to suggest means of achieving the legislative objective that 
would be less impairing to the accused's Charter rights. In this case, it 
may be argued that one could encourage rescuing behaviour through 
avenues other than the Code. For example, society could encourage 
rescuing behaviour through the creation of incentives other than 
possible criminal culpability. This may include offering monetary 
rewards to those who rescue, conducting education programs on helping 
victims without endangering oneself, raising awareness of the 
90 As suggested in note 85, supra, the Court may apply a more relaxed Oakes analysis. In 
that case, the rational connection criteria would be satisfied if the Crown established that there 
was a reasonable connection between the provision and its objective. It seems clear that there 
is a tenable connection between the failure to rescue provision and its two-fold objective of 
decreasing the harm to associated with violent crime and making the system more accountable 
to victims of violence. 
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psychological impact of voyeurism on v1ct11ns, et cetera. These 
arguments are particularly strong since they are means of achieving the 
pressing and substantial objective without impairing Charter rights at 
all. 
Unfortunately, these alternative programs are not likely to be as 
effective in encouraging rescuing behaviour as criminal culpability. 
There are already many reward and recognition programs in place for 
Good Samaritans, yet, the fact that we still encounter the situations 
represented by Dunlop and Clarkson suggests that these programs are 
ineffective. Perhaps this is because reward programs continue to 
characterize the rescuer's behaviour as atypical or superhuman. In short, 
the "ordinary" person does not aspire to win awards or recognition for 
being a Good Samaritan; in fact, by depicting the rescuer as a hero such 
programs allow regular people to continue to deny their responsibilities 
to others. Fmther, reward programs continue to be oriented towards the 
glorification of the rescuer, rather than focusing on the victim's needs. 
This fails to make the system more accountable to victims of violence. 
Finally, in most cases, it is not the reward that motivates the rescuer, it is 
his/her connection to the victim or some other factor. Thus, reward 
programs do not provide adequate incentives to be effective in 
promoting rescuing behaviour. 
At present, there are already numerous educational campaigns 
regarding, for example, violence against women. It seems, however, that 
these campaigns have not been totally effective in reducing the 
incidence of gender-specific violence. In fact, as mentioned above, 
nearly one in four women experiences a sexual assault in her lifetime, 
despite the existence of numerous government-funded and private 
education programs. 91 It has not yet been shown that the harm associated 
with violent crime will be significantly decreased, or that the system will 
be made more accountable to victims of violence, through more 
education programs. Rather, may victims may see these programs as 
government attempts at shirking their responsibility to victims of 
violence. Only a criminal provision imposing a duty to rescue has the 
potential to trnly reduce the harm associated with violent crimes, as well 
as making the justice system aligned with victim's interests. 
91 Statistics Canada, supra note 2. 
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Finally, the Crown would have to show that the hannful effects of 
the legislation do not outweigh the benefits associated with the 
provision. The deleterious effect of the provision is that it compels 
people to act and, thus, may infringe their right to liberty. As noted 
above, the bystander's right to watch as other people are dehumanized 
and physically harmed does not go to the heart of the traditional concept 
of liberty. The minute infringement of one's liberty interest does not 
outweigh the tremendous positive aspects associated with a duty to 
rescue: namely, the decrease in harm associated with violent crime, as 
well as the increased accountability of the justice system to the victim. 
Therefore, it is likely that, even if the provision was deemed 
unconstitutional under s. 7, there is a good chance that it would be upheld 
under s.1. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There were nearly 42,000 reported, and approximately 450,000 
unreported, incidents of sexual assault in Canada in 1993.92 These 
numbers suggests that Parliament must continue its attempts to make the 
Criminal Code more accountable to victims of gender-specific violence. 
In pa11icular, there must be recognition that wider reforms are needed if 
victims of multiple-party sexual assaults, for example, are to be 
protected under the law. Our current sexual assault provisions, even 
when coupled with s.21, fail to account for the group dynamics of 
situations such as those encountered in Dunlop and Clarkson. Despite 
the criticisms of a duty to rescue, it is apparent that such a duty must be 
incorporated into Canadian criminal law. The proposed failure to rescue 
provision would mark a step forward in the recognition of the unique 
nature of multiple-party sexual assault and the culpable nature of those 
who watch as women are dehumanized. More broadly, the proposed 
provision would adequately address the morally reprehensible 
behaviour of those who watch as others are murdered and assaulted. It 
would also decrease the harm associated with violent crimes, and make 
the justice system more accountable to victims of violence. Making the 
92 Ibid 
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justice system more accountable to female victims may encourage more 
women to report incidents to the police. Indeed, through the lens of 
multiple-party sexual assault, it is clear that Parliament must implement 
a duty to rescue. 
